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In November 2018, President of Ireland Michael D. Higgins 
signed into law the thirty-seventh amendment to the Irish 
Constitution, removing the word “blasphemous” from Article 
40.6.1.i (which prohibited “the publication or utterance of blas-
phemous, seditious, or indecent matter”). A crime since the 
document’s 1937 ratification, the blasphemy provision was 
scrapped after a public vote in which nearly sixty-five percent 
of participants agreed to its removal.
Ireland’s Constitution can only be changed by referendum. 
The blasphemy vote was one of several such referenda held in 
recent years. It followed the May 2018 decision to repeal the 
eighth amendment (which, by giving equal legal status to both 
the fetus and the woman carrying it, criminalized abortion) and 
2015’s equal marriage referendum, in which Ireland became 
the first country to legalize same-sex marriage by popular vote. 
Given that the official Catholic hierarchy campaigned heavily 
against both proposals, these votes were read as evidence that 
the Church was no longer the primary guiding force for the 
Irish people.
For many outsiders, this spate of referenda—and the 
changing place of the Catholic Church that they were taken to 
signify—was met with glee: proof that the arc of history bends 
toward social liberalism. If conservative, religious Ireland could 
vote to legalize same-sex marriage, the New Yorker breathlessly 
suggested, so too could Mississippi (Sorkin 2015)!
While some celebrated, however, others wondered how 
bans on abortion and blasphemy could have survived so late 
into the twenty-first century. “The population has moved on, 
[people are] no longer controlled by the Catholic Church, but 
a lot of the laws that were put in place are still there,” argued 
Michael Nugent, the head of Atheist Ireland and a veteran cam-
paigner against the blasphemy law. “We have to chip away at 
them and get the state to catch up with the people” (Graham-
Harrison 2018).
But what would this “catching up” look like? Narratives 
of legal and cultural progress in which conservative religious 
shackles are slowly shed may make for good copy, but they 
rarely reflect the complicated reality governing the interaction 
of law, politics, and religion in contemporary nation-states. 
Indeed, studying the historic interaction of religion and law 
in named polities—that is, the law’s regulation of religion, re-
ligion’s influence on legal norms, and the semisubmerged 
theological underpinnings of many contemporary legal catego-
ries—is more likely to lead to recognition of the contingency of 
these relationships than to an acceptance of the “tidy stories” 
in which one is slowly filtered out from the other (Johnson, 
Klassen and Sullivan 2018, 5).
This review offers three case studies as an introduction to 
historical accounts of law and religion. Focusing on the law’s 
regulation of religion and religion’s salience to law in post- 
Reformation England, the seventeenth-century Caribbean, and 
British-controlled India, these historical investigations of the 
law-religion nexus shed light on the broader contexts in which 
states, constitutions, communities, and “religions” are formed 
and governed.
In particular, they emphasize the ways in which legisla-
tion concerning “religion” has involved the production and 
regulation of difference in multicultural, multiethnic, and 
multireligious states. This is demonstrated by, inter alia, 
the changing place of the established church in England, 
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where the distinction between Catholic and Protestant has 
been somewhat superseded by the distinction between reli-
gion and the secular; the role of Christian missionaries in 
the racialization of slavery in the Americas, where legally 
enshrined Protestant supremacy developed into white su-
premacy; and the strategic mobilization of the law in India, 
where the embrace of litigation cemented a distinctive eth-
noreligious identity among Zoroastrian Parsis. As all three 
regions struggle with political polarization and the normal-
ization of ethnonationalism, these works shed light on the 
historical developments underlying such divisions, offering 
much needed context for scholars working in and on these 
countries today.
From Sectarianism to Pluralism
If “law and religion” is a growing subfield of legal and/or 
religious studies, it is one that raises definitional issues fa-
miliar to scholars of both. So notes Julian Rivers’ The Law 
of Organized Religions, which begins: “This is a systematic 
study of English law as it applies to organized religions. None 
of these terms is particularly satisfactory” (vii). Given this 
difficulty, Rivers’ ability to synthesize centuries of legisla-
tion and legal cases into a coherent narrative is impressive. 
Beginning with the Roman conquest of Britain circa 43 CE, 
he provides an overview of the legal regulation of religion(s) 
to the present day, albeit with a focus on developments from 
the nineteenth century onward. It is an undeniably ambitious 
project, not least because, as he puts it, there is no clear “con-
stitutional principle” that could be said to govern organized 
religion in English law (345).
The narrative he tells is one of rising religious diversity 
(and tolerance of that diversity) alongside the emergence of a 
commonly held belief that church and state ought to be kept 
separate. By the mid-nineteenth century, English law had 
begun to move from the assumption that all religions were 
unlawful unless they were specifically recognized and pro-
vided for to the assumption that all religions were lawful so 
long as they were not outlawed. In this way, the “changing 
law of Church and State [is characterized by] a slow transi-
tion from the maintenance of one true religion to the princi-
ple that there is, in law, no false religion” (24). (Another way 
of putting it, as Rivers intimates, is that all religions are now 
recogniszd as being equally false, legally speaking.) Given 
the coterminous fact of religious establishment and separa-
tionist assumptions, the Church of England (CoE) has come to 
function as a kind of paradigm for church-state engagement, 
normalizing the presence of religion in public life for both 
established and nonestablished traditions. “This dynamic 
tension,” Rivers suggests, “has been the substitute for any 
statement of constitutional principle” (345).
This is a story in which religious establishment and re-
ligious pluralism, although initially opposed, increasingly 
rely on one another to justify their place in the public sphere. 
Establishment continues, but it is no longer the explicitly dis-
criminatory, punitive regime of prior decades. Indeed, repre-
sentatives of the established church increasingly seek to speak 
on behalf of those framed, in the parlance of our times, as 
people of faith (as opposed to people of a particular faith, re-
ligion, or tradition)—a sharing of privilege only thinkable in a 
context where the critical difference is no longer that between 
Anglicans and Catholics, but between people “of faith” and 
those who do not so identify. (“Religion,” as former Archbishop 
of Canterbury Rowan Williams once put it, is increasingly seen 
to be the preserve of “oddities, foreigners and minorities” by 
members of the political class [Batty 2009]; and such oddities 
must stick together.)
While this move toward religious pluralism has made it 
easier for members of nonestablished traditions to organize 
their worlds according to religious precepts and practices, it 
has also been accompanied by a “thoroughgoing process of 
secularization” that Rivers worries will impact this relatively 
newfound ability (25). In particular, he argues that the state’s 
tendency to view religious liberty as a matter of individual 
conscience (as opposed to actions, practices, and community 
norms and standards) is a troublingly narrow understand-
ing of what religious freedom means (30–36). This strand of 
analysis runs throughout the book, which is critical of legal 
efforts to enforce normative, romanticized visions of what 
religion “is” or should be (for example, through requiring re-
ligious organizations to be “publicly beneficial” for the pur-
poses of charity law, or by insisting that these organizations 
comply with equalities legislation in the same way other as-
sociations are expected to).
Following an initial overview of the history of English 
law and religion, the book then adopts a thematic approach, 
discussing legislation and case law relating to, among oth-
ers, ministers of religion; chaplaincies; faith-based welfare; 
and religious schools. Rivers does an admirable job of high-
lighting the ambivalence that seems to undergird much of 
the relationship between religious organizations and the law. 
For example, Chapter Three focuses on what he terms “the 
centre of the law of organized religions,” that is, “the legal 
constitution of religious bodies” (72). Historically, this rela-
tionship has been defined by ignorance or hostility, at least 
for nonestablished traditions. Roman Catholic and Jewish or-
ganizations, for example, could be easily disrupted by a legal 
system that did not recognize their institutional structures or 
social forms.
More recently, however, the situation has been marked 
by a different kind of tension, one in which judicial over-
sight is simultaneously requested and resented. Religious 
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organizations may seek the protection of the law, but they 
are also wary of submitting themselves to secular power. 
Similarly, the courts are keen to protect religious citizens 
even as they are wary of venturing into disputes that might 
be deemed “theological.” As a result, today’s English judges 
are (in theory) less willing to rule on issues relating to doc-
trine than their nineteenth-century forbears, either declaring 
these nonjusticiable in sum or attempting to “filter out” the 
“religious dimensions” of a dispute. Problems arise, Rivers 
suggests, not merely as a result of the tension between 
regulation and rejection, but because there are occasional 
“[mismatches] of expectation and approach as to its proper 
resolution” (73). If a religious organization seeks a ruling on 
an interest that the court sees as moral or theological (as op-
posed to properly “legal”), there may be disappointment when 
the courts declare the issue nonjusticiable (90). (How these 
judges distinguish between “merely” theological and properly 
legal interests is, of course, a matter of heated debate.)
A similar tension is evident in the state’s regulation of re-
ligious schools (known as “faith schools”), which represents 
one of the most “contested” fields of church-state law. Since the 
1997 election of Tony Blair’s New Labour government, schools 
“with a faith-based ethos no longer represent a tolerated his-
toric residue but have been welcomed as part of a new mul-
ticultural agenda” (and, of course, a neoliberal tendency to 
delegate public services to civil society) (234). In addition to 
institutions affiliated with the CoE and other Protestant denom-
inations, the state also funds Catholic, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, 
and Sikh schools (although the vast majority of faith schools 
are Anglican).
While this openness has been welcomed by many religious 
groups, Rivers notes that it has not come without cost. Greater 
state collaboration often translates to greater state control. The 
desire of religious bodies to set admissions and employment 
policies that run counter to equalities legislation reveals “the 
extent to which the current law of education is locked into a 
post-Christian paradigm, in which ‘religion’ only affects spe-
cifically religious instruction and collective worship” (259). As 
such, faith schools are a particularly clear example of Rivers’ 
overarching thesis: they index efforts to recognize religious 
pluralism by drawing on a model shaped by Christianity, while 
also reflecting secular norms and assumptions that serve as a 
limit to these schools’ autonomy.
Rivers’ account is not only descriptive. It is also rooted in 
a normative wariness of what he deems the excesses of secu-
larism. He is critical of (some) efforts to separate church and 
state and worries about state incursion into religious worlds, 
suggesting that although courts are increasingly willing to 
recognize that religious issues are “at stake,” they remain 
“quite unwilling to allow [them] to outweigh considerations 
of the monistically-conceived public interest” (333). Indeed, 
he suggests that equality and diversity provisions have the 
potential to become “worryingly oppressive” in the future 
(346).
Whether one accepts this normative angle will influence 
one’s response to the work. Some readers may take issue 
with the idea that state efforts to prevent discrimination by 
religious bodies on the grounds of gender or sexuality (for 
example, as regards the employment of women) are best 
understood as “ideological bullying” (334); after all, at least 
some of the impetus for challenging such norms comes from 
the women within these communities themselves. (One could 
just as easily argue that these women’s religious rights are 
violated by their churches as that their churches’ religious 
rights are violated by the state.) Of course, there is a prin-
cipled argument to be made that protections for, inter alia, 
women and sexual minorities should be waived in defense 
of religious liberty, and Rivers advocates broad exemptions 
for religious groups on these grounds. Yet he fails to fully 
engage with the fact that ensuring religious liberty for some 
may well come at the expense of others. Further, and given 
that his argument is undergirded by the fact that religious 
diversification is taking place at the same time as the growth 
of secular and non-theistic assumptions, greater elaboration 
on why religious organizations (but not others) ought to be 
granted these wide exemptions would be helpful for readers 
not predisposed to accept religious liberty as an unqualified 
good.
In the decade since The Law of Organized Religions was 
first published, controversies involving religion and equality 
provisions have continued to make headlines. There is some 
evidence that UK judges have taken on board Rivers’ critique 
of state “ideologizing” (see, for example, Lee (Responding) v 
Ashers’ Baking Company, which held that Christian bakers 
could not be compelled to ice a cake with the words “Support 
Gay Marriage”).
Yet the case law remains haphazard, affirming Rivers’ 
view that there is no definite “constitutional principle” gov-
erning this field (345). In legal scholar Russell Sandberg’s—
somewhat more direct—terminology, the situation is simply 
“hideously confused” (2018, 152). For lawyers like Sandberg, 
this lack of principle is problematic. A coherent body of law 
would help religious groups, local authorities, and individual 
citizens to know where they stand, what is expected of them, 
and from which laws they can reasonably diverge. For these 
reasons, Sandberg encourages the development of a “universal 
definition” of religion in English law.
For our purposes, however, the English case is instructive 
precisely because it lacks a well-developed guiding principle. 
That the law appears unprincipled is indicative of the fact that 
it has developed piecemeal in response to political conflict both 
nationally and internationally; to the rise of tolerance and ecu-
menism as goals to be pursued; and to the changes in religious 
demographics prompted by the collapse of empire. As Rivers 
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himself puts it, “The relationship between law and religion in 
any country is a reflection of historical contingencies, contro-
versies, and compromises” (1).
England is currently readying itself for the seismic legal 
changes likely to result from its withdrawal from the European 
project. In a post-Brexit, increasingly disunited United Kingdom, 
the regulation of religious diversity remains a pressing issue, 
and the “law of organized religions” will be an area of legisla-
tion and litigation well worth monitoring.
From Protestant Supremacy to Christian Slavery
Historical contingencies cast long shadows. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the co-construction of race and reli-
gion in what historian Katharine Gerbner, in her recent book 
Christian Slavery, calls “the Protestant Atlantic world.” Drawing 
on data from Barbados, the Danish West Indies, and North 
American slave colonies from the 1600s through to the late 
1700s, Gerbner shows how Protestant missionaries were in-
strumental in the legal codification of white supremacy and 
race-based slavery in the Americas.
More specifically, she charts the move from Protestant 
supremacy (in which professing Protestant Christianity was 
firmly associated with physical liberty and political rights), 
to “Christian slavery” (in which Protestantism, although it of-
fered spiritual freedom, was deemed compatible with physical 
enslavement), to white supremacy (by which time race, rather 
than religion, had become the ultimate marker of freeperson 
status). In so doing, she contributes to scholarly genealogies 
of the categories “black” and “white” and corrects a somewhat 
romanticized vision of Protestant missionaries as the inevi-
table forebears of abolitionism. By contrast, she shows how 
these missionaries “fought hard to accommodate slavery to 
their Christian principles,” leading to legislation “affirming 
that Protestant status was compatible with perpetual bondage.” 
If their writings can be understood as the antecedents of the 
antislavery movement, she argues, they should also be under-
stood “within the long history of proslavery thought” (4); for 
regardless of these missionaries’ ostensible desire to improve 
the lot of enslaved Africans, contemporary white supremacy 
has its roots in their efforts to “Christianize” this most barbaric 
of institutions.
This is an important thesis. As Gerbner notes, much his-
torical work on Protestantism in the colonies focuses on its 
relationship to the antislavery movement. Even denominations 
not known for their commitment to abolitionism, such as the 
Anglican and Moravian churches, have had scholars “read a 
humanitarian impulse into their early missionary ventures.” 
As such, she prompts a rethinking of those often associated 
with laying the groundwork for eighteenth-century abolition-
ism, including Quakers: “Far from anticipating the antislavery 
position, these Protestant missionaries articulated and circu-
lated a vision for Christian slavery that laid the groundwork 
for the proslavery apologists of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries” (4).
Gerbner focuses on planters’ shifting responses to the 
evangelization of enslaved peoples from the mid seventeenth 
to the late eighteenth centuries. In the mid-1600s, most settlers 
were convinced that conversion necessitated manumission. As 
such, they were opposed to the religious instruction of those 
they had enslaved and greeted missionaries with hostility. By 
the final decades of the eighteenth century, however, the emer-
gence of the doctrine of Christian slavery had led many such 
planters to accept the presence of missionaries, some of whom 
touted baptism as a means of making enslaved persons “more 
docile and obedient than their non-Christian counterparts” 
(133).
Gerbner uses a combination of personal narratives, baptis-
mal records, missionary literature, and legislation to make the 
case that Anglican, Moravian, and Quaker missionaries played 
a key role in this transition, thus laying the groundwork for a 
fully racialized approach to slavery. Chapter Six, for example, 
which explores the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
in Foreign Parts’ (SPG) efforts to convert enslaved Africans, fo-
cuses on the work of two named individuals: Elias Neau and 
Francis Le Jau. These men, French Protestants living in New 
York and South Carolina, responded to the dominant ideol-
ogy of Protestant supremacy by stressing the compatibility of 
Protestantism with slavery. Neau sought “to reform laws to 
ensure the legality of owning Christian slaves” (117); Le Jau 
required all enslaved adults to make a declaration stating that 
they did not seek baptism “out of any design to free [them-
selves] from the duty and Obedience [owed to their enslavers]” 
(125).
Chapter Four, “From Christian to White,” charts the grad-
ual replacement in colonial legislation of the word “Christian” 
with the word “white” as a marker of free status. While “schol-
ars have long recognized that whiteness emerged from the 
protoethnic term ‘Christian,’” Gerbner pushes this argument 
forward by focusing on the intimate relationship between the 
category of “white” and the conversion of enslaved peoples 
(74). In Barbados, for example, this category gained salience 
in response to the “small but growing” population of free black 
Christians. By the late seventeenth century, some members of 
this community were technically eligible for freeholder status, 
which, according to English law, required freeholders to be 
“adult, Christian, propertied, and male” (84). Given that free 
black men could attain all these markers, Anglo-Caribbean 
whites began to rethink the relationship between Protestantism 
and political rights.
The result, Gerbner argues, was the legal codification of 
a racial requirement for freeholder status, thus excluding this 
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growing community from the right to vote or run for office. 
For example, between 1660 and 1690, the term “white” was 
rarely used in Barbadian legislation. Indeed, it appears just 
three times in thirty years. Yet its use increased dramatically 
between 1690 and 1700 (during which time the free black com-
munity was growing), peaking in the first decade of the eigh-
teenth century. The use of the term “Christian,” by contrast, 
shows an inverse trend.
As such, “by the eighteenth century, whiteness had re-
placed Christianity as the primary indicator of nonslave sta-
tus” (84). Legislation such as the Act for the speedy supply of 
Arms, Ammunition, Stores and white Servants (1696) and the Act 
to keep inviolate and preserve the Freedom of Elections (1709) 
legally condemned both free and enslaved persons of African 
heritage to the status of a racial underclass, “regardless of their 
religious affiliation or cultural practice” (86).
While these Acts relate to Barbados, similar changes took 
place throughout the Atlantic world. This included the colo-
nies in New York, Maryland, and Virginia, the last of which 
sought to encourage planters to allow the evangelization of 
enslaved persons by issuing a legislative opinion stating that 
“the Conferring of Baptisme doth not allow the Condition of 
the slave as to his bondage or freedom” (88). While baptism 
had previously been a tool in the legal arsenal of those seeking 
manumission—for example, as in the case of Elizabeth Key, who 
sued successfully for freedom in 1654 in part on the basis of her 
baptism and knowledge of Christianity—the last decades of the 
seventeenth century saw the gradual uncoupling of freedom 
from Protestantism.
Gerbner emphasizes the interdenominational context in 
which the conversion of enslaved peoples took place. Much 
historical writing on Christianity and slavery in Latin America 
and the Caribbean focuses on (Catholic) Spanish, Portuguese, 
and French colonies, where enslaved persons were frequently 
baptized into the Catholic Church (sometimes against their 
will). Yet some colonies featured “confessional borderlands” 
in which Protestant and Catholic missionaries and planters 
could observe one another’s efforts at converting enslaved men 
and women. In this way, “Protestant ideas about slavery often 
emerged in relation to Catholic practice” (5). Similarly, among 
the Protestant churches, “interdenominational rivalry” played 
a role in the different denominations’ decisions to advocate for 
the conversion of enslaved persons. The Anglican Church, for 
example, embraced slave evangelism in response to criticism 
from the Quakers.
Christian Slavery does not shy away from the inevitable 
complexities and tensions underlying one of the book’s core 
concepts: that of conversion. While some scholars avoid the 
term for theoretical, historical, and/or moral reasons (in addi-
tion to reifying religion by implying that one trades one sys-
tem for another, it privileges missionary goals rather than the 
experience of enslaved peoples), Gerbner prefers to recognize 
this tension, using a range of materials and techniques “to 
examine how non-Europeans perceived and narrated their en-
gagement in Christian rituals” (7). Enslaved Africans converted 
for many reasons (only some of which would have pleased 
their European evangelizers). Some recognized the benefits of 
Protestant status; some pursued Christianity as a way of access-
ing literacy and education, including as a means of challenging 
or undermining slavery itself; some will have been convinced of 
the power or truth of Christianity. Many conversions will have 
involved a combination of these, while some baptisms—for ex-
ample, those of children—may have been carried out against the 
wishes of parents or guardians.
The case of Peter, a child baptized on Barbados in 1652, is 
a poignant example of the dearth of options for persons surviv-
ing under the immense and horrific violence of slavery. While 
the baptismal register lists the name of Peter’s father—a white 
man named Jacob Heming—his mother’s name is not recorded. 
It is likely that she was enslaved by Heming. Whether she sup-
ported Peter’s baptism (perhaps thinking it would offer him 
social or spiritual protection) or not (perhaps viewing it an un-
welcome, foreign ritual), “she certainly had a very narrow set 
of options placed before her” (78). The same is true of the many 
other enslaved persons whose forced “intimacy” (sexual or oth-
erwise) with whites led to their baptism. Theirs was an agency 
exercized in a context of physical, social, and spiritual violence, 
repression, and constraint.
Gerbner’s final conclusions are damning: “the most 
self-sacrificing, faithful, and zealous missionaries in the 
Atlantic world formulated and theorized a powerful and last-
ing religious ideology for a brutal system of plantation la-
bour” (196). This “powerful and lasting” ideology continues 
to poison the former colonies on which Christian Slavery fo-
cuses. Given the persistent, endemic violence meted out and 
justified by reference to “whiteness,” Gerbner’s book is de-
pressingly timely. It is an important resource for scholars and 
teachers looking to explain and challenge legalized racism in 
our own time.
From Religious Community to Ethnic Identity
While some colonized populations have racial or religious clas-
sifications forced upon them, others use the law to cement 
such identities themselves. Such was the case with India’s 
Zoroastrian Parsi minority in the lead up to independence, 
whose embrace and appropriation of colonial-era law is the 
subject of Mitra Sharafi’s masterful Law and Identity in Colonial 
South Asia.
Focusing on Parsi use of the legal system from 1776 to 
1947, Sharafi examines both the (Parsi-led) creation of a sys-
tem of personal law and Parsis’ interaction with the legal 
system as legal actors. Through frequent recourse to colo-
nial law, “Parsi lobbyists, legislators, lawyers, judges, jurists, 
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and litigants de-Anglicized the law that controlled them by 
sinking deep into the colonial legal system itself.” Rather than 
assimilating to English norms or losing their identity to the 
colonizers, Sharafi argues, “their mastery of the form of 
Anglo legalism enabled them to evacuate its contents” (5). 
Thus, while “many colonized and minority populations at-
tempted to protect themselves by avoiding interaction with 
the state, the Parsis did the opposite,” enabling the creation 
of “pockets of autonomy” at the heart of the British Empire’s 
legal and political institutions (8–9, 5).
Sharafi opens by noting the ways in which Zoroastrian 
Parsis differed from other communities in British-controlled 
India circa 1850. While Hindus and Muslims were governed 
under Anglicized interpretations of “religious” law (the so-
called personal law system), Parsis were taken to lack “a real 
legal tradition” (1). As such, they were ruled according to the 
laws of England. By the time of India’s independence almost 
a century later, however, the situation was radically different. 
Not only had Parsis used the courts to develop a body of Parsi 
personal law, but they had also “become some of the British 
Empire’s greatest lawyers and judges” (3). They were experts 
in English law and custom, both working in colonial courts and 
using them to settle disputes with their fellow Parsis.
Sharafi’s interest in Parsi legal activism was prompted by 
what seemed like a numerical discrepancy. In the early twentieth 
century, she notes, the Parsi community was made up of about 
100,000 persons dispersed throughout India. Even in Bombay, 
where the community was the most concentrated, Parsis were 
only six percent of the population. Yet they made up almost 
twenty percent of parties involved litigation. “Why,” she asks, “did 
Parsis sue each other so frequently in the colonial courts?” (6).
The “each other” element here is critical. In addition to 
being willing to take those from outside the community to 
court, Parsis were also willing to legalize intra-community dis-
agreements. Given that colonization might well have resulted 
in a firmer commitment to resolving issues within the commu-
nity out of a desire to avoid interaction with or regulation by the 
colonial state, Parsi litigiousness seems to require explanation.
Rather than focusing on theology or doctrine as an explan-
atory measure, Sharafi focuses on the institutional factors that 
encouraged Parsis to take to law. Among these, she notes that 
they did not have well-developed dispute resolution procedures 
at the community level. A decentralized priesthood meant there 
was no clear hierarchy in place, and the priestly role was one 
of ritual obligations rather than the provision of advice or me-
diation. (We will return to the importance of—and the difficulty 
of maintaining—ritual purity below.) Further, Zoroastrianism 
lacked a legal tradition comparable to Judaism or Islam, “in 
which law was an elaborate and formalized subfield of religious 
knowledge” (72). Whereas other diasporic communities in pol-
ities that recognized personal law could point to longstanding 
religio-legal principles, Parsi Zoroastrians—whose forebears 
had come to India from Persia between the tenth and fourteenth 
centuries CE—had no such body of law to which to point. (Much 
of their written heritage had been destroyed in successive 
waves of attack while in Persia, while other aspects of religious 
knowledge may have been lost as a result of migration.)
Yet Parsi-led initiatives soon changed this. From the 1830s 
onward, “Parsis organized themselves into lobby groups that 
drafted and pushed for the passage of legislation pertaining 
to Parsi marriage and inheritance,” thus replacing English 
legal norms with those that reflected (elite) Parsi values (84). 
Through this lobbying, Parsis effectively created their own 
system of personal law, a system largely administered by Parsi 
lawyers and judges. In marked contrast to the situation facing 
British India’s Hindu and Muslim communities, the male elites 
of which were disempowered by a personal law system that 
rested on “juryless courts” rather than “community bodies,” 
elite Parsi men were able to cement their community power 
and to legislate their understanding of proper Parsi behavior.
Sharafi also shows how such men used the law to en-
trench certain notions of identity. Of particular interest is her 
account of “Parsi eugenics,” which played a key role in bringing 
Persianness to the fore as a marker of community membership. 
While the “study of race and racial discourse in British India 
has concentrated on European perceptions of racial difference,” 
she uses a series of early twentieth-century court cases to em-
phasize the importance of studying “racial attitudes between 
colonized populations” (275–6). This is a useful contribution to 
the literature on race and empire, and the cases Sharafi uses to 
explore this subject—defamation and libel suits centering on rit-
ual purity and paternity—provide extremely interesting exam-
ples of the increasing racialization of community membership.
For reasons both local and global, the early twentieth cen-
tury saw a renewed focus on the importance of Persian heritage 
as a marker of true Parsi identity. This is reflected in cases such 
as Saklat v Bella (1925). Bella, the adopted child of a Parsi cou-
ple, was initiated into the Zoroastrian religion at the age of four-
teen. Although her biological father was likely Parsi, she was 
presented as having been born to an Indian Christian couple. 
This caused a group of orthodox Parsis to seek to bar her from 
the fire temple: “Only members of the community could enter 
the temple and see the sacred fire. The presence of outsiders in-
side the temple would defile it” (288). Thus began a decade-long 
dispute over the question of community membership: was the 
important issue one’s religious initiation and ritual observance, 
or one’s racial and ethnic heritage? Drawing on the thought of 
Dinshah Davar, the first Parsi judge of the Bombay High Court 
(and a proponent of a racially exclusive understanding of Parsi 
identity), the Privy Council in London ultimately held that 
although Bella could be granted entry to the temple on a dis-
cretionary basis, she was not entitled to enter by right. Their 
decision reflected an increasingly exclusivist notion of identity 
founded not only on culture and religion, but on race.
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Bella’s case, as well as a spate of libel suits brought 
against those who publicly questioned a Parsi’s Parsi heri-
tage, shine light on “changing Parsi views” about race and 
religion during this period (293). For a diasporic community 
worried that their distinctive identity would fade unless en-
dogamy was enforced, “the global rise of the eugenics move-
ment” enabled the assertion of exclusivist notions of Parsi 
“racial purity” (296). Perhaps, Sharafi suggests, the focus on 
racial purity came about as a result of the difficulty of main-
taining religious, or ritual, purity: “Parsis could not adhere 
strictly to the purity laws if they wanted to take advantage 
of the educational, professional and financial opportunities 
afforded by imperial subjecthood . . . But if being Parsi was 
no longer about following the Zoroastrian purity laws, what 
was it about?” (311). In Sharafi’s analysis, race emerges as 
an obvious candidate. Given the litigiousness that she docu-
ments so well, it is no surprise that these intragroup debates 
so often played out in court (and given the role of the law in 
circumscribing various aspects of identity, perhaps it is no 
surprise that J. J. Vimadalal, a proponent and popularizer of 
Parsi eugenics, was also a prominent lawyer).
Sharafi is convincing in her account of the impact of Parsi 
legal activism. Her meticulous analysis of litigation, legisla-
tion, and individual legal biographies all confirm that “what 
made Parsi law Parsi was not historically Zoroastrian content 
as much as it was the fact that Parsis made it” (313). She also 
points out, of course, that “law also made the Parsis” (316), for 
example, in the way Parsi persons adopted legal processes. Yet, 
this aspect of the relationship takes up much less space in the 
text, and the reader is sometimes left to wonder whether Parsi 
lawyers, judges, litigants, and commentators were not more 
shaped by legal “cunning” than is sometimes implied (Povinelli 
2002; Fernando 2014).
Of course, as she notes, the fact that she is working with 
historical material makes it difficult to determine the impact 
of these cases on her subjects’ inner worlds. From an ethno-
graphic perspective, though, it remains a pertinent question; 
not least because the religious and racial divisions introduced 
or cemented by the personal law system feature so prominently 
in contemporary Indian politics.
Contemporary Resonances
I start this conclusion with a confession. As careful readers will 
no doubt have noticed, I am not a historian. I am not trained in 
the study of the past. If anything, my own discipline has not 
always sat well with history: anthropologists write in the eth-
nographic present. Why, then, focus this review on legal histo-
rians’ contribution to the field of law and religion?
At the risk of cliché, one simple reason is that the eth-
nographic present always depends on the ethnographic 
past. Historians are often uncomfortable with other scholars’ 
tendency to leap between eras, to anachronistically apply con-
cepts from one context to another, or to assert simplistic causal 
relationships between headlines and history. Channeling L. P. 
Hartley, for example, Sharafi reminds us that “Observations 
about the present do not necessarily tell us about the past, that 
proverbial foreign country” (314). To view today’s world as the 
inevitable outcome of the past is to adopt, in Samuel Moyn’s 
words, a “church history” approach that assumes its conclusions 
from the outset and works backward to confirm them (2010, 6).
These warnings are well taken. Yet what is striking about 
the three books discussed above is how contemporary much of 
the historical data feels. In England, the Americas, and India, 
legal disputes centring on the drawing of ethnoreligious bound-
aries continue to make headlines. In all three areas, the history 
explored here resonates. We cannot understand the anxieties 
raised by the possible reintroduction of a hard border on the 
island of Ireland, for example, without grappling with the legal 
establishment of Protestantism in England, as Julian Rivers 
does in The Law of Organized Religions. Similarly, we cannot 
understand the structural racism built into the United States’ 
criminal justice system without studying the racialization of 
slavery in the seventeenth century, as Katharine Gerbner’s 
Christian Slavery clearly illustrates. And we cannot understand 
the violence facing contemporary Kashmiris without reference 
to the British colonizers’ divide and rule approach to manag-
ing colonized peoples, the personal law element of which Mitra 
Sharafi’s Law and Identity sheds such important light on.
Simplistic teleologies are, of course, to be avoided. Yet, 
glossing over the past is equally problematic. As scholars of 
law and religion, we must be attentive to the outcomes, both 
logical and otherwise, of centuries’ worth of religious prac-
tice, legislation, and litigation. (To return to Ireland’s recent 
wave of constitutional referenda, we need historians who can 
see beyond both The New Yorker’s triumphalism and Atheist 
Ireland’s ahistoricism.) Gerbner, Rivers, and Sharafi offer 
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